

# Credit Frictions, Housing Prices, and Optimal Monetary Policy Rules

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# Main question

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- ◆ Optimal monetary policy under credit market frictions  
How should monetary policy react to house prices?
- ◆ Important question....in particular nowadays

# Main contribution

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- ◆ Welfare evaluation
- ◆ Includes both lenders and borrowers  
Wealth redistribution
- ◆ Careful economic interpretation

# Main limitation...

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- ◆ No financial stability aspect  
As the rest of the literature

# In this paper

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







- ◆ Patient and impatient households
- ◆ Loan-to-value shocks
- ◆ Sticky prices
- ◆ 2nd order approximation

# Main results

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- ◆ Optimal policy: positive to inflation, mute to output and interest rate smoothing and negative response to house prices

# Technology



$$b_{it} \leq \gamma_t E_t \frac{q_{t+1} \pi_{t+1} h_{it}}{R_t} .$$

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Weak response to inflation has a negative impact on welfare of lenders and positive effect on that of borrowers

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- ◆ Inflation trade-off between lenders and borrowers:  
Weak response to inflation has a negative impact on welfare of lenders and positive effect on that of borrowers
- ◆ Asymmetric dynamics  
MP amplifies positive shocks and dampens negative shocks

# Some remarks

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- ◆ House prices or house price inflation?

Bernanke and Gertler look at returns

- ◆ Agents can not switch categories: borrowers vs. lenders

- ◆ Indeterminate equilibrium

Including house prices reduce determinate region

Lubik and Schorfheide (JEDC 2003) linear model

# Possible extensions

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- ◆ Capital (entrepreneurs)
- ◆ Housing investment

# Conclusions

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- ◆ Good timing for the paper
- ◆ Interesting new results  
Asymmetries was my favorite!
- ◆ Serious approach to welfare evaluation