

# Swing pricing and flow dynamics in light of the Covid-19 crisis

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### Our focus: swing pricing

#### Funds are exposed to a liquidity risk:

• Open-end investment funds engage in a liquidity transformation as they offer shares that are more liquid than their assets. This liquidity gap could lead to a dilution of portfolios.

#### A solution: swing pricing?

- Objective: to reduce the risk of dilution by adjusting the net asset value (NAV) in order to reallocate the liquidity cost from remaining to transacting investors.
- Context: Swing pricing was authorized in France in 2014. Its use is promoted by the major financial institutions to strengthen the financial stability of this sector.
- Different types: the activation and intensity of swing pricing depend on conditions set by funds' managers.
- Potential drawback: perverse effects due to negative reaction of investors (stigma effect)?

#### Our study


Research question: What is the impact of swing pricing implementation on funds' flow dynamics in light of the COVID-19 crisis?

- First study to analyze swing pricing implementation on an exhaustive sample (3000+ funds, 80% of all French OEFs) by using a natural language processing algorithm on prospectuses.
- We evaluate the impact of swing pricing on flow dynamics during a very severe market stress, the COVID-19 crisis.
- We identify the implementation of swing pricing (ability to use this tool): analysis of the impact of the implementation modalities + capacity to identify a potential stigma effect.

#### **Data description**

Swing pricing: identified by mandatory disclosure in prospectuses.

from 3.4% to 8.1% in three years.



Acceleration of swing pricing implementation Two constraints impact the activation and intensity of swing pricing:


- Partial swing pricing: NAV adjustment only if flows exceed a threshold.
- Swing factor cap: upper bond on the NAV adjustment.

|                   | Partial swing pricing |           |  |
|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------|--|
|                   | No                    | Yes       |  |
| Cycles factor can |                       | 60.4% (1) |  |
| Swing factor cap  | 1.1% (1)              | 31.9% (2) |  |

Continuous variable "Constraints": number of constraints on the swing pricing mechanism.

## Flows and systemic stress:

- Main dependent variable: weekly flows per fund share divided by previous total net assets (black line).
- Systemic stress: VIX CAC40 > 90th percentile (grey area).



## Immediate impact of swing pricing introduction on flows level

## Motivation:

Investors could react to swing pricing introduction through different channels, e.g.:


- Belief updating on ex-ante liquidity risk (signal of higher vulnerability) that can cause outflows.
- Fund structure change can cause inflows from investors seeking stable funds or outflows due to a potential increase of the total redemption cost.


## Methodology:

- Matching: each fund implementing swing pricing (treated group) is matched with a comparable fund without swing pricing (control group) on granular portfolio and investors characteristics.
- Event-study staggered differences-in-difference following two steps:

Step 1:  $Flows_{i,t} \sim \beta_0 + \beta_1 Controls_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \phi_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$  (Computation of residualized flows) Step 2:  $\tilde{\epsilon}_{i,t} \sim \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treated_i + \sum_{i,t} (\beta_{2t} Relative Date_t + \beta_{3t} Relative Date_t \times Treated_i) + \epsilon_{i,t}$ 

**Results**: flight of investors following swing pricing pricing introduction  $\implies$  Stigma-effect.





## Impact of swing pricing on flows volatility during systemic stress

#### Motivation:

- More stable flows decrease portfolio restructuring costs and thus potential dilution, especially during systemic stress.
- Swing pricing provides an incentive for investors to limit transaction costs and thus to spread large redemptions and subscriptions over multiple NAV.

#### Methodology:

• Specification 1: differentiation of effects under systemic stress and standard conditions:  $Vol_{i,t} \sim \beta_0 + \beta_1 Stress_t + \beta_2 SP_{i,t} + \beta_3 (SP_{i,t} \times Stress_t) + \beta_4 Controls_{i,t-1} + \beta_5 \gamma_i + \beta_6 \phi_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$ 

 Specification 2: Influence of constraints on the sensitivity of flow volatility to swing pricing estimated with a triple interaction term  $(SP_{i,t} \times Stress_t \times Constraints_{i,t})$ .

#### **Results:**

- Weak evidence that swing pricing decreases flow volatility.
- However, without constraints, we find a stabilizing impact of swing pricing.

|    |         | (3)<br>-0.299**<br>(0.121) | (4)<br>-0.432***<br>(0.131) |
|----|---------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
|    |         |                            |                             |
|    |         |                            |                             |
|    | ,       | (0.121)                    | (0.101)                     |
| -  | -       | 0.241**<br>(0.098)         | 0.247**<br>(0.098)          |
| No | Yes     | No                         | Yes                         |
|    | -<br>Vo | <br>No Yes                 | (0.098)                     |

## Impact of swing pricing and flows level during systemic stress

#### Motivation:

 Swing pricing ability to address redemption pressures during stress market conditions could limit potential dilutions.

#### Methodology:

• Same specifications as for volatility with consecutively Flows, Negative Flows (i.e.  $Flows \times \mathbb{1}_{Flows < 0}$ ) and  $Positive\ Flows$  (i.e.  $Flows \times \mathbb{1}_{Flows > 0}$ ) as explained variables.

#### Results:

- Swing pricing decreases net flows during systemic stress ... by reducing inflows.
- However, without constraints, swing pricing has a stabilizing impact by reducing redemptions ... but also reducing subscriptions  $\implies$  stigma effect.

|                           | Flows    | O       | Pos. flows | Flows    | Neg. flows | Pos. flows  |
|---------------------------|----------|---------|------------|----------|------------|-------------|
|                           | (1)      | (2)     | (3)        | (4)      | (5)        | (6)         |
| (selected coefficients)   |          |         |            |          |            |             |
| SP x Stress               | -0.126** | 0.011   | -0.137***  | 0.100    | 0.207**    | -0.106*     |
|                           | (0.061)  | (0.048) | (0.036)    | (0.108)  | (0.087)    | (0.064)     |
| SP x Stress x Constraints | -        | -       | -          | -0.186** | -0.161**   | -0.025      |
|                           |          |         |            | (0.085)  | (0.069)    | (0.048)     |
| Note:                     |          |         |            |          | matcl      | ned dataset |

## Impact of swing pricing on flows level during idiosyncratic stress

## Motivation:

- Idiosyncratic stress: periods of previous large outflows and liquidity strain  $\implies$  high restructuring cost.
- Funds are vulnerable during these periods: large unexpected outflows faced in situations of a deteriorated liquidity generate a dilution risk.
- How swing pricing reduces the sensitivity of net flows to idiosyncratic stress?
- High restructuring cost  $\implies$  partial swing pricing activated and high expected swing factor.

## Methodology:

- Triple interaction model to explain  $Flows: Outflows_{i,t-1} \times Illiquidity_{i,t-1} \times SP_{i,t}$
- Constraints: we isolate the impact of implementing a capped swing pricing as partial swing pricing is supposed to be activated.

## Results:

- Swing pricing increases flows during idiosyncratic stress.
- The effect strengthens for swing pricing without cap.
- The effect vanishes for capped swing pricing.

|                             |         | 1 10 00 5 |           |
|-----------------------------|---------|-----------|-----------|
|                             | (1)     | (2)       | (3)       |
| (selected coefficient)      |         |           |           |
| SP × Outflows × Illiquidity | 0.200** | 0.305***  | -0.094    |
|                             | (0.098) | (0.098)   | (0.162)   |
|                             |         |           |           |
| Type of SP                  | All     | W/O cap   | W/ cap    |
| Note:                       |         | matched   | d dataset |
|                             |         |           |           |

# Conclusions

As currently implemented in France, swing pricing does not improve financial stability, as:

- Constraints on the activation and intensity of swing pricing decrease its stabilizing effect.
- Swing pricing is associated with a stigma effect that reduce inflows during turmoil and generate immediate outflows.

However, we highlight a strong stabilizing effect in the absence of constraints or when the portfolio restructuring cost is high.

⇒ The calibration of swing pricing thus appears crucial to enable the stabilizing effect to offset the stigma effect.

## Policy recommendations:

- Favor the implementation of unconstrained swing pricing.
- Mandatory implementation of swing pricing to avoid the stigma effect.

## References

- [1] Agostino Capponi, Paul Glasserman, and Marko Weber. Swing pricing for mutual funds: Breaking the feedback loop between fire sales and fund redemptions. Management Science, 2020.
- [2] Dunhong Jin, Marcin Kacperczyk, Bige Kahraman, and Felix Suntheim. Swing pricing and fragility in open-end mutual funds. The Review of Financial Studies, 35(1):1-50, 2022.
- [3] Ulf Lewrick and Jochen F Schanz. Is the price right? swing pricing and investor redemptions. BIS Working Papers, 664, 2017.



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