Sentiment in Bank Examination Reports and Bank Outcomes

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Motivation

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 - Econometric specification.
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 - Results from subsamples.
- Conclusion
 - Bank examinations provide a meaningful role in the surveillance of the banking system.

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- Banks are important intermediaries in the financial system
 - Receive and manage deposits in order to originate loans and invest in securities.
 - Their safety and soundness integral to the stability of the financial system.

Literature and Contribution

- Supervisory ratings and supervision at commercial banks
 - Significant relationship with abnormal returns (Berger and Davies, 1998).
 - Helps forecast macroeconomic variables (Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell, 1999).
 - Supervisory actions lead to stock market reactions (Jordan, Peek, and Rosengren, 2000).
 - BOPEC ratings forecast problem loans & earnings (Berger, Davies, and Flannery, 2000).
 - Supervisory attention leads to less risky loan portfolios (Hirtle, Kovner, Plosser, 2020).
 - CAMELS ratings have predictive power for bank performance and risk measures (Gaul and Jones, 2021).


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- Our contribution
 - By looking at bank examination reports, we provide more granular evidence of meaningful private information creation during the bank examination process.

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
- We look at small and medium-sized state-member banks (SMBs) whose primary regulator is the Federal Reserve.
- Lead examiner alternates between the relevant Federal Reserve Bank and the state-level financial regulator.
- Goal is to assess the safety and soundness of the commercial bank.
- Conducted every 6 to 18 months, main outputs are exam reports and ratings.

Bank Examination Reports in Our Sample



- Capital Adequacy: Ability of the bank to absorb losses.
- Asset Quality: Known and likelihood of losses the bank might face.
- Management: Quality of the management team, compliance function, audit function, and business strategy.
- Earnings: Ability of the bank to provide returns on their activities.
- Liquidity: Ability of the bank to absorb short term funding difficulties.
- Sensitivity to Market Risk (we ignore in our analysis).

CAMELS Ratings Distribution in Our Sample




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- Consider different dictionaries:
 - LM (Loughran and McDonald, 2011).
 - FS (Correa, Garud, Londono, and Mislang, 2017).
 - QDAP (Hu and Liu, 2004).

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 - QDAP (Hu and Liu, 2004).
- Consider different methodologies:
 - Polar = (# of Positive Words # of Negative Words)/(# of Positive + Negative Words).
 - TF-IDF = Term Frequency Inverse Document Frequency.
 - Valance shifter.

Chatterplot for Capital Sections




Chatterplot for Capital Words - LM Dictionary

Sentiment Classification a Positive a Negative

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Chatterplot for Earnings Sections



Chatterplot for Earnings Words – LM Dictionary

Sentiment Classification a Positive a Negative

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Look at how various sentiment scores correlate with Composite and CAMELS Ratings:

CAMELS score_s =
$$\alpha + \beta$$
Sentiment score_{s,m,l} + ϵ ,

where s is the section of the exam, m is the sentiment score method, and l is the sentiment score lexicon, with constant term α and coefficient β and an error term ϵ .


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LM Polar and LM Valence Shifter have generally the highest explanatory power!

Sentiment Score Distribution by Composite CAMELS Score



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LHS Outcome Variables		Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	5th Percent.	95th Percent.
Overall/Mgmt	MRIA/MRA sum	5,259	2.931	5.345	0	14
	MRIA/MRA dummy	5,259	0.394	0.489	0	1
Capital	Tier 1 ratio	5,335	15.873	10.556	9.438	28.373
-	CET1 ratio	5,332	15.787	10.196	9.388	28.373
Asset Quality	Loan loss provisions/loans	5,332	0.300	0.572	0	1.346
	4-qtr net charge-offs/loans	5,264	0.109	0.187	-0.010	0.482
	Delinquent loans/loans	5,332	2.636	2.634	0.083	7.877
Earnings	4-qtr ROA	5,335	0.311	0.389	-0.348	0.800
_	4-qtr PPNR/assets	5,335	0.780	0.527	-0.043	1.523
Liquidity	Securities/assets	5,335	21.126	13.799	2.395	72.293
	(Cash+securities)/assets	5,335	28.254	14.572	8.575	55.864

outcome_{*i*,*t*} =
$$\rho$$
 outcome_{*i*,*t*-1} + β sentiment_{*i*,*c*,*t*-1} + γ log(assets_{*i*,*t*-1})
+ $\Sigma_{n=1}^{4} \psi_n$ CAMEL dummy_{*i*,*n*,*t*-1} + θ_i + ϕ_t + $\epsilon_{i,t}$,

for bank *i*, in period *t*, for bank exam component *c*, and where θ_i and ϕ_t are bank and time fixed effects, respectively.

Sentiment in Bank Exams (All Sections) and MRAs/MRIAs

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	MRA/MRIA Sum		MRA/MRIA Dummy	
VARIABLES	Polar	Valence	Polar	Valence
Lag sentiment	-6.161***	-11.89***	-0.792***	-1.597***
Lag sentiment	(0.693)	(1.663)	(0.0600)	(0.134)
Lag MRA/MRIA Sum	-0.348***	-0.354***		
Lag MRA/MRIA dummy	(0.0222)	(0.0221)	-0.515*** (0.0179)	-0.528*** (0.0178)
(CAMELS dummies, etc. omitted)				
Observations	5,259	5,259	5,259	5,259
Fixed effects	bank & year	bank & year	bank & year	bank & year
R-squared	0.516	0.514	0.615	0.612
Adj. R-squared	0.400	0.397	0.523	0.519

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sentiment in Bank Exams (Capital Adequacy) and Capital Ratios

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Tier 1 Ratio		CET1 Ratio	
Polar	Valence	Polar	Valence
0.500++++	2 1 2 0 * * *	0.520***	0.011.***
0.000			2.011***
(0.190)	(0.642)	(0.185)	(0.636)
0.343***	0.342***		
(0.0624)	(0.0628)		
		0.349***	0.349***
		(0.0630)	(0.0634)
5,335	5,335	5,331	5,331
bank & year	bank & year	bank & year	bank & year
0.922	0.922	0.916	0.916
0.903	0.903	0.896	0.896
	Tier 1 Polar 0.568*** (0.190) 0.343*** (0.0624) 5,335 bank & year 0.922	Tier 1 Ratio Polar Valence 0.568*** 2.120*** (0.190) (0.642) 0.343*** 0.342*** (0.0624) (0.0628) 5,335 5,335 bank & year 0.922	$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $

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Sentiment in Bank Exams (Asset Quality) and Problem Loans

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Loan Loss Pro	Loan Loss Provisions/Loans 4-qtr Net Charge-offs/Loa		rge-offs/Loans	s Delinquencies/Loans	
VARIABLES	Polar	Valence	Polar	Valence	Polar	Valence
Lag sentiment	-0.267***	-0.746***	-0.0969***	-0.281***	-0.747***	-2.212***
	(0.0406)	(0.102)	(0.0149)	(0.0369)	(0.168)	(0.407)
Lag loan loss provisions/loans	0.211***	0.207***				
	(0.0275)	(0.0274)				
Lag 4-qtr net charge-offs/loans			0.246***	0.238***		
			(0.0282)	(0.0282)		
Lag delinquency rate					0.483***	0.478***
					(0.0225)	(0.0225)
(CAMELS dummies, etc. omitted)						
Observations	5,332	5,332	5,147	5,147	5,332	5,332
Fixed effects	bank & year	bank & year	bank & year	bank & year	bank & year	bank & year
R-squared	0.523	0.525	0.535	0.538	0.710	0.711
Adj. R-squared	0.407	0.410	0.421	0.425	0.639	0.641

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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Sentiment in Bank Exams (Management) and MRAs/MRIAs

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	MRA/MRIA Sum		MRA/MRIA Dummy	
VARIABLES	Polar	Valence	Polar	Valence
Lag sentiment	-1.856***	-4.752***	-0.242***	-0.589***
e	(0.341)	(0.965)	(0.0273)	(0.0754)
Lag MRA/MRIA Sum	-0.351***	-0.353***		
c	(0.0222)	(0.0221)		
Lag MRA/MRIA dummy			-0.534***	-0.537***
			(0.0182)	(0.0182)
(CAMELS dummies, etc. omitted)				
Observations	5,259	5,259	5,259	5,259
Fixed effects	bank & year	bank & year	bank & year	bank & year
R-squared	0.516	0.516	0.601	0.600
Adj. R-squared	0.400	0.399	0.506	0.504
Pobust standard arrors are in paranth	accor *** m <0	01 ** n < 0.05	* n < 0.1	

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sentiment in Bank Exams (Earnings) and Earnings Ratios

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
	Weighted	4-qtr ROA	Weighted 4-qtr PPNR/Assets		
VARIABLES	Polar	Valence	Polar	Valence	
Lag sentiment	0.235***	0.669***	0.263***	0.693***	
-	(0.0194)	(0.0544)	(0.0223)	(0.0584)	
Lag weighted 4-qtr ROA	0.359***	0.342***			
	(0.0244)	(0.0249)			
Lag weighted 4-qtr PPNR/assets			0.420***	0.414***	
			(0.0293)	(0.0295)	
(CAMELS dummies, etc. omitted)					
Observations	5,335	5,335	5,335	5,335	
Fixed effects	bank & year	bank & year	bank & year	bank & year	
R-squared	0.706	0.710	0.782	0.783	
Adj. R-squared	0.634	0.639	0.729	0.730	

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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Sentiment in Bank Exams (Liquidity) and Liquid Assets

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Securities/Assets		(Cash+Securities)/Assets	
VARIABLES	Polar	Valence	Polar	Valence
Lag sentiment	0.289	0.959	-0.324	-2.276*
Lag sentiment	(0.289)	(1.010)	(0.340)	(1.170)
Lag securities/assets	0.672***	0.672***		
Lag (cash+securities)/assets	(0.0176)	(0.0176)	0.647*** (0.0179)	0.648*** (0.0179)
(CAMELS dummies, etc. omitted)				
Observations	5,335	5,335	5,335	5,335
Fixed effects	bank & year	bank & year	bank & year	bank & year
R-squared	0.929	0.929	0.912	0.912
Adj. R-squared	0.912	0.912	0.891	0.891

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

- When it comes to management, these results are driven by banks with better ratings;
- When it comes to asset quality and earnings, these results are driven by banks with worse ratings and during the GFC period;
- Interacting (lagged) sentiment with lagged outcome variables indicates that sentiment is even more meaningful when various outcome variables are elevated;
- One exception is earnings, where positive sentiment, for example, tends to attenuate the effects of lagged earnings ratios.

- We investigate to see if supervisory information helps predict future bank outcomes.
- Even controlling for bank ratings themselves, the answer seems to be YES!
- Bank supervisors play a meaningful role in the surveillance of the banking system by creating and sharing information that is embedded in bank examination reports through the bank examination process.